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The Twilight of the China’s Decade?
American Problems with Chinese  
Trade Policy
The main goal of this article is to present to the European reader the implications of the cri-
sis of the Chinese banking system, which peaked in August 2015, and triggered a period of 
high volatility in the U.S. stock market. As a result, trade relations between China and the 
U.S. have deteriorated, which raises the question of whether the Chinese economic system 
will implode and contribute to the global crisis, or whether it can be controlled by Beijing?
 The article assumes two things: that subsidies are at the core of U.S. criticism of Chi-
nese trade priorities; and that to understand recent American-Chinese trade conflicts, we 
must first review the more general issue of American attitudes towards the subsidizing 
practices of non-market economies.
 The article will conclude with the observation that, in discussing the obvious points 
that China needs more market-oriented reforms and should be more open to U.S. trade 
priorities, we may overlook some other more important problems, such as differences in 
the business cultures of both countries. So, rather than forcing uncertain compromises, 
American and Chinese trade experts must develop better problem solving skills and dis-
cuss new fields of collaboration.
Key words: U.S.-China trade relations, subsidies, non-market economies, Chinese bank-
ing crisis, protectionism, Chinese accession to WTO, most-favored nation status, currency 
manipulations, trade penalties, WTO dispute resolution system
It is unquestionable that the crisis of the Chinese banking system, which peaked 
in August 2015 and January 2016, affected American monetary markets. The slow-
down in the growth of China’s GDP, as well as rumors about the forthcoming in-
crease in interest rate by the American Federal Reserve, triggered major volatility in 
the U.S. stock market. The media began considering whether the Chinese economic 
system would implode and contribute to the global crisis, or whether it could be 
controlled by Beijing. To what extent were China’s economic problems rooted in 
politics? Can we expect the end of China’s decade?
Rett R. Ludwikowski222
The main goal of this article is to present to the European reader the implications 
of the crisis of the Chinese banking system, which resulted in deterioration of trade 
relations between China and the U.S. The article is relatively short and primarily fo-
cused on issues related to American trade policy. So, the reader must be aware that it 
should be supplemented by the separate studies exploring the economic rather than 
legal aspects of the problems described therein.
This article assumes two things: that subsidies are at the core of U.S. criticism 
of Chinese trade priorities; and that an understanding of recent American-Chinese 
trade conflicts requires a more general analysis of American attitudes towards the 
subsidizing practices of non-market economies. For this reason, the first chapter 
starts with an examination of the decisions from the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and U.S. courts which shaped American countervailing policy (CVD) in the mid-
1980s. It will review the evolution of U.S. attitudes towards Chinese subsidizing 
practices in the first decade of the 21st century. It will also examine the seminal deci-
sion made by U.S. courts in GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, the GPX Act of Con-
gress, the WTO’s review of the United States’ use of “double remedies,” and finally, 
the implementation of WTO directives in America.
The article will conclude with the suggestion that the focus of the trade debate in 
the U.S. should be changed. Discussing some obvious arguments of American trade 
experts that China needs more market-oriented reforms and a more open attitude to-
wards U.S. trade priorities would not be very productive. So, rather than pushing the 
governments towards uncertain compromises, American and Chinese trade experts 
must improve problem solving procedures and discuss new fields of collaboration.
Historical Background of the”Trade War”1
The search for the origins of American problems with CVD measures used against 
non-market economies brings us back to two final negative countervailing duty de-
terminations – Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19370 (Dep’t Comm. 1984) (C-435-001), and Car-
bon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 
Fed. Reg. 19374 (Dep’t Comm. 1984)(C-455-003) – in which the Department of Com-
merce (DOC) concluded that “the bounties or grants cannot be found in nonmarket 
economies.”
The Department of Commerce’s decisions were challenged at the U.S. Court 
of International Trade in Continental Steel Corp. v. United States (614 F. Supp. 548, 
Ct. Int’l Trade 1985), which held that, contrary to the Department’s determina-
tions, U.S. CVD law covers both market and nonmarket economies. However, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. 
United States (801 F. 2d 1308, Fed. Cir. 1986), reversed this decision and upheld the 
DOC’s determinations. In its key conclusion, the CAFC stated that the Congress 
1 The research for this part of the article was done for the American Bar Association. 
A summary of the author’s comments has been published as a short note in the Quarterly 
Newsletter, Customs and International Trade Bar Association (CITBA), winter 2014, under the ti-
tle, “Rebuttable Presumptions–New Developments in the U.S. ‘war’ with Chinese subsidies.” 
Part of the note has been incorporated (with the permission of the publisher) into this text.
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intended to apply only antidumping laws to non-market economies, and that the 
legislative history provided no indications of its changing attitude. 
After more than 20 years of U.S. settled policy, the problem was revisited by the 
DOC, which realized that some non-market economies, such as China’s, may get 
a lot of double benefits from their WTO membership. On one hand, the agreement 
that China would be recognized as a non-market economy until 2016 had been in-
corporated into China’s WTO accession protocol. It provided the country with sig-
nificant trade benefits which stemmed from the recognition that it’s economy is still 
an “economy in transition.” On the other hand, the U.S. claimed that, regardless the 
accession agreement, China must prove that its market-oriented reforms are real 
and satisfy the standards set by the world’s most powerful market economies.
Professor Patrick Mulloy, former Commissioner of the US-China Economic and 
Security Commission, noted in the book, Leveraging: A Political Economic and Societal 
Framework (ed. by D. Anderson), that until its accession to the WTO, the U.S. admin-
istration periodically renewed China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. It gave 
the U.S. broad discretion regarding China’s eligibility for low U.S. tariffs. According 
to the “non-discrimination” clause of Art. 1 of the GATT, China received MFN sta-
tus on a permanent basis after joining the WTO. Among other benefits, WTO mem-
bership protected China from U.S. unilateral retaliatory sanctions imposed under 
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. 
The fact that under U.S. criteria certain Chinese industries have been granted 
“a market-oriented economy” status encouraged the DOC to consider the possibil-
ity of imposing anti-subsidy (countervailing) duties on imports from China. Also, in 
light of Chinese currency manipulations, which did not allow the country’s Yuan to 
flow freely, the shift towards more demandable trade policy with China and more 
generally with non-market economies (NME’s), seemed to be justifiable.
Polarization of American Trade Politics
For years, American trade experts have warned that with anticipated financial problems, 
China may suddenly start selling its foreign currency reserves, which may become an 
enormous threat for the stability of the American economy. These predictions proved 
true when China depreciated its currency and sold U.S. dollars and treasury bonds 
at the beginning of the 21st century – multiple times. (See: Tania Branigan in Beijing 
and Heather Stewart, China sells $34.2bn of US treasury bonds,17 February 2010, http://
www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/17/china-sells-us-treasury-bonds; see 
also: Robert Hennelly, MoneyWatch, August 31, 2015, China’s sale of U.S. debt: Safety 
valve or cause for concern?). This intervention in monetary markets, sometimes reaching 
the level of “manipulation,” calls for some introductory comments.
Problems with the Chinese currency – renminbi (RMB–money of the people) – 
started in 2005, when the Chinese government decided to reevaluate and unpeg the 
RMB from the dollar. (A Brief History of the Renminbi (Chinese Yuan– China’s currency. 
http://chineseculture.about.com/od/thechinesegovernment/a/RMB.htm). Unpeg-
ging the RMB paved the way for two monetary strategies: rational intervention in 
China’s capital markets; and manipulation of the value of foreign currencies. Below 
is one example presented by the YChart Incorporation (US): “US Dollar to Chinese 
Yuan Exchange Rate is at a current (March 14, 2016) level of 6.506 down from 6.531 
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the previous market day and up from 6.266 one year ago. This is a change of -0.38% 
from the previous market day and 3.84% from one year ago.” (See,US Dollar to Chinese 
Yuan Exchange Rate. https://ycharts.com/indicators/chinese_yuan_exchange_rate). 
As C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon of the Peterson Institute for Internation-
al Economics wrote four years ago in a policy brief entitled, Currency Manipulation, 
the US Economy, and the Global Economic Order, “The United States has (already) lost 
1 million to 5 million jobs as a result of this foreign currency manipulation” (12/25, 
2012, http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2302).
Although these figures are basically correct, economists note that seeking de-
preciation, or making a country’s currency less expensive, is a normal feature of 
“easy monetary policy.” This policy is used in all major economies, including in the 
United States. In theory, the depression of a currency should trigger demand for that 
country’s exports, strengthen its economic potential, and create jobs. If, however, 
the trading partner (China in this case) devaluates its currency according to those 
of other countries (the U.S. in this case), then the expected benefits of an easy mon-
etary policy fade away. This response to the easy monetary policy may start a “de-
bilitating currency war.” (For more information, see the article by Jerry Jasinowski 
of the same name, 08/02/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/
currency-manipulation_b_3694908.html).
In addition, China, as a primarily export-oriented country, has created a trade 
imbalance which remains a great concern for the American government and the 
main political parties. Trump, the newly elected American President, claimed that 
American imports of Chinese goods exceed the value of American exports to China 
by $500 billion. Although Trump overestimated the figures, the U.S. trade deficit 
with China did hit a record high in the middle of the second decade of 21st century. 
(https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2015). To sum up, 
the governmental subsidies, currency manipulations, and enormous corruption in 
China have triggered angry reactions from American trade experts for decades. All 
of these factors resulted in growing tensions between the U.S. and China.
Economic experts in the U.S. basically split into two major camps. The first claims 
that the Chinese economy is slowing down, but not collapsing. Representatives 
thereof argue that at the end of the 1970s, China’s share of world trade markets was 
not larger than 0.6%. When this article was written at the beginning of 2016, China 
was still the second largest economy in the world. Indeed, it had trade agreements 
with 120 states, and held about 4 trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves. As Ian 
Bremmer recalled, even with Chinese economic growth slowing down to 7% in 2015, 
“a total of 38% of global growth last year came from China, up from 23% in 2010” 
(Bremmer, “The China Decade”, Time, pp. 40-42).
It is essential for this group to note that sharp growth in GDP during the initial 
phase of market reforms was observed in the Asian Tigers such as Taiwan, Singa-
pore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. However, these countries, along with Japan, 
have experienced periods of slower growth in the last two decades.2 From this per-
spective, it can be argued that China’s problems may only be temporary and will not 
necessarily trigger a global economic slowdown.
2 For more comments, see R.R. Ludwikowski, Handel Międzynarodowy, 3rd ed. C.H. Beck, 
Warszawa 2012, pp. 159-162.
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The second camp of commentators claims that the crisis was inevitable because 
integration of market instruments with a centrally-governed economy has its limita-
tions. This is a paradox of semi-authoritarian countries – their state-dominated econ-
omies require both governmental control and individual discretion in the economic 
decision-making process. In the opinion of this group, the combination of these two 
factors in China has created a Pandora’s box which, if opened, may affect all other 
actors of global trade.
U.S. Options in Re-Working Trade Policy Towards NMEs
In considering the larger picture, the United States wanted to be a strong and effec-
tive partner for the Asia Pacific region. But Chinese maneuvers, which were taking 
advantage of America’s unclear policy towards non-market economies, could no 
longer be tolerated. The DOC thus had just two options: either it could lobby for new 
legislation clarifying Congressional intentions toward non-market and market-ori-
ented economies; or it could initiate CVD investigations without a clear authoriza-
tion of Congress. Given Congress’s trade-related legislative backlog, the DOC opted 
for the second option.
Since 2006, over two dozen CVD orders have been issued by the DOC against 
imports from China. The decisions have been challenged in U.S. courts and in the 
WTO. In both cases China argued that the almost automatic assumption that the 
governments of non-market economies subsidize imports was the reason for the 
double counting of the incentives offered to Chinese companies.
In December 2008 China followed up with another complaint to the WTO re-
questing that its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establish a panel to determine the 
legality of U.S. use of “double remedies” – i.e. simultaneous application of anti-
dumping and countervailing penalties. On October 22, 2010, the panel report (Dis-
pute S379) was sent to the U.S., China, and third parties involved in the dispute. The 
report rejected most of China’s claims, and China subsequently appealed. On March 
11, 2011, the WTO Appellate Body largely reversed the panel’s ruling, concluding 
that simultaneous use of double duties by the U.S. violates WTO rules.3
U.S. courts were not slow to follow suit. In a landmark decision in GPX Int’l Tire 
Corp. v. United States (2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 114, Oct. 1, 2010), the Court of Inter-
national Trade ordered the DOC not to impose countervailing duties on goods from 
China, a non-market economy country. The court remanded the case with instruc-
tions for the DOC, and on appeal, the CAFC affirmed the CIT decision. The CAFC 
concluded that “if Commerce believes that the law should be changed, the appropri-
ate approach is to seek legislative change” (GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 
F.3d 732, 745, Fed. Cir. 2011).
This time, Congress acted quickly to draft the Application of Countervailing 
Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries (Pub. L. No. 112-99), signed by 
the President on March 13, 2012, as the GPX Act. Also, regarding the application 
3 For a detailed summary of both rulings, refer to the World Trade Organization’s, Dis-
pute Settlement: United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, Web. December 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds379_e.htm.
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of countervailing duty provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671) to non-
market economy countries, Congress decided that “the merchandise on which coun-
tervailing duties shall be imposed under subsection (a) includes a class or kind of 
merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United 
States from a nonmarket economy country.” Congress made an exception to the 
above rule; namely, that CVDs are not required to be imposed when “the adminis-
tering authority is unable to identify and measure subsidies provided by the gov-
ernment of the nonmarket economy country or a public entity within the territory of 
the nonmarket economy country because the economy of that country is essentially 
comprised of a single entity.’’ Congress also allowed the DOC to adjust antidump-
ing duties should «double counting» occur.
Another Round of the U.S.– China Trade “War”
As was expected, the GPX Act triggered a new wave of criticism in China. Shen 
Danyang, spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, said “China hoped the 
U.S. would stop its wrongdoing as soon as possible, to preserve fair competition for 
Chinese enterprises.” He further stated that Congress, contrary to Chinese hopes, 
and in violation of common trade rules, decided in 2012 to retroactively legitimize 
the U.S.’s anti-subsidy practices used since 2006 (Shaobin, News Analysis: U.S. double 
remedies in question after WTO report).
In May 2012, China requested consultations with the United States, and on No-
vember 14, 2012 the DSB established a new Panel which was asked to review 17 
countervailing duty determinations in which the DOC decided that Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) were “public bodies in the meaning of Art 1/1 of the 
SCM-Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement”.
The WTO Panel rejected several Chinese allegations that the United States misin-
terpreted certain provisions of the SCM Agreement; namely, Art 2.1 on the specific-
ity test, which makes countervailing measures subject to governmental discretion 
in selecting the beneficiaries of subsidies. The Panel also did not agree with China’s 
allegations that the U.S. violated Art 12.7 on “the use of the facts available.” This 
strategy allows a country imposing CVDs to rely on available information in case 
subsidizing authorities fail to cooperate.
Nonetheless, the Panel found that the DOC broke certain WTO rules when it pre-
sumed that Chinese state-owned enterprises are “public bodies” capable of provid-
ing subsidies. The Panel stated, on the basis of former WTO decisions, that state own-
ership alone does not prove government control. On August 22, 2014, China filed an 
appeal to the WTO of most of the issues on which the Panel did not rule in its favor. 
The Appellate Body report was distributed to Members on December 18, 2014.
The implementation of WTO decisions has brought about some interesting pro-
cedures in AD/CVD proceedings. U.S. Section 129 of the Uruguay Agreements Act 
provides for certain actions which must be undertaken in implementing procedures. 
These include consultations with the U.S. Trade Representative, the International 
Trade Commission, the Administering Authority of the Commerce Department, and 
the Congressional Commissions. These agencies are required to determine whether 
U.S. administrative actions following the WTO’s decisions ended inconsistency with 
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WTO rules. If the inconsistency would be found, the DOC must revoke or amend its 
antidumping or countervailing orders.
Since 2012, several AD/CVD rates in Chinese cases have been amended as the 
final result of recent proceedings under Section 129.4 In certain recent cases, includ-
ing Multilayered Wood Flooring, and Narrow Woven Ribbons, the DOC has issued no-
tices to interested parties of its intent to conduct a Section 129 proceeding in order to 
make “a determination not inconsistent with the findings of the World Trade Orga-
nization dispute settlement panel and Appellate Body.”
Conclusions: Is There Still Enough Room for Negotiation  
and Compromise?
The new wave of Chinese economic turbulence in January 2016 provoked angry 
reactions from American presidential candidates, who demanded imposition of pu-
nitive tariffs on Chinese imports.5 However, representatives of both American par-
ties, albeit reluctantly, had to admit that the imposition of higher tariffs on Chinese 
imports does not favor American interests in the long-term.
U.S. history, particularly the crisis of the interwar period triggered by the 
U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 4) proved that protectionism may 
be disastrous and may contribute to economic depression. As Derek Scissors wrote, 
protectionism “would harm the United States too much, even if it harmed China 
more /…/” (in “Deng Undone”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2009, pp.39). As claimed 
above, expectations that state-capitalism will suddenly disappear under pressure 
from the U.S. are not realistic enough. Therefore, the gradual liberalization of the 
Chinese economy without resorting to a real trade war seems to be in the U.S.’s best 
commercial interests.6
On June 25, 2014, Daniel R. Russel, assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, confirmed the official U.S. position with regard to China 
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stating, “We view 
China’s economic growth as complementary to the region’s prosperity, and China’s 
expanded role in the region can be complementary to the sustained U.S. strategic 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific. We and our partners in the region want China’s rise 
to contribute to the stability and continued development of the region.”7
From the perspective of China, its recent banking crisis makes the trade relations 
with other economic superpowers such as the United States not only attractive, but 
necessary for its survival. So, on the one hand, China keeps questioning the incon-
sistency of American trade policy towards non-market economies through the WTO 
4 These Section 129 decisions can be found at: Enforcement and Compliance, us depart-
ment of Commerce, International Trade Administration Enforcement and Compliance, Web. 
January 2016, http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/section129/full-129-index.html 
5 See, for example, Haley S. Edwards, “Donald Trump, Tariff-Supporting Free Trade,” 15 
January 2016, Time.com, http://time.com/4181999/donald-trump-tariff-free-trade/
6 For more comments, see Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age,” Foreign Af-
fairs, May – June 2009, pp. 55).
7 US Department of State, The Future of China –US Relations, 22.12.2015, Web. December 
2015, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm)
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and American courts. On the other hand, however, China claims that its non-market 
status expired in December 11, 2016, the day that marked the 15th anniversary of the 
country’s accession to WTO.
The impact of Section 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol on the country’s 
forthcoming market-economy status has entailed both advantages and disadvan-
tages which cannot be overlooked. The biggest advantage that a market-oriented 
economy enjoys is the determination of economic developments more by supply 
and demand, and less by “good relations” with trade partners. Still, the devel-
opment of market mechanisms is by no means automatic, and progress made by 
a market-oriented country must be recognized by other world economic powers to 
some extent.
At this moment, the fact that China, as a market economy, will theoretically be 
subject to commonly agreed anti-subsidy measures and other unfair trade penalties 
does not seem to satisfy the “market standards” of the U.S., the EU, or Canada. Tes-
tifying before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on Febru-
ary 24, 2016, Alan Price, former President of the Committee to Support U.S. Trade 
Laws (2012-2014), summarized the position of American trade experts:
China is not a market economy. Whether the criteria considered are those under U.S., 
EU, or Canadian law, the results are the same. Nothing in the international obligations 
of the United States requires it to treat China as a market economy absent such a finding 
under national law. Treating China as a market economy when it is not one would have 
a significant negative impact on the U.S. economy, and would give China a strong and 
unearned advantage in international trade. It would remove a major incentive for China 
to implement market-based reforms, and allow it to ignore the commitments it made in its 
Protocol of Accession to allow prices to be set by market forces.
Reservations such as those presented above undermined confidence in Chi-
na’s intensified lobbying to gain “market economy status.” For example, despite 
China’s moderate interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) trade ne-
gotiations, the country was left out of the agreement. This fact confirms that China, 
as a state which continues to disrespect international trade and investments rules, 
may lose important benefits that came with its easy accession to the WTO (Solís, 
“The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP”).
In summing up the observations presented above, two main reflections come to 
mind. Firstly, there is no doubt that evaluation of U.S.-China relations is a challeng-
ing task, and easing the tension between these two countries requires more than just 
declarations of goodwill. It is obvious that China needs more market-oriented re-
forms and must be more open up to American trade priorities. However, lip service 
only does not contribute to constructive dialogue.
Secondly, both parties must make sacrifices and ease demands which stem from 
the different business cultures of both countries. Forcing compromises may aggra-
vate economic tensions rather than facilitate collaboration. In other words, trade ex-
perts from both countries need more problem solving skills, and must focus on con-
crete goals. These include: combating global climate change cooperation in space; 
welfare programs, use of actionable rather than prohibited subsidies; sustainable 
development of the Asian region;; and common investment projects in Africa and 
Latin America.
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